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As highlighted by Kleiderman and Kellner Stedman’s (2019) recent article, the case for the use of 
genomic technologies, such as CRISPR/cas9 to undertake germline editing of human embryos has 
been gaining momentum in recent years. In the UK, for example, a license was granted to 
researchers in 2016 to allow CRISPR research using human embryos- although such embryos would 
not be permitted to develop past 14 days (HFEA, 2016).  
Monogenetic rare conditions are amongst those most frequently targeted by those developing 
human genome editing technologies, with recent claims of curative editing techniques being 
achieved for Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy (Nelson et al, 2019), Fragile X Syndrome (Yrigollen and 
Davidson, 2019) and Cystic Fibrosis (Brothers et al, 2019), despite continued highly restrictive global 
governance of the practice, ongoing concerns about its future biological impacts and evolving 
debates regarding its social and ethical implications (Daley et al, 2019; Ormond et al, 2019).  
Unlike other forms of reproductive genetic disease prevention, such as pre-conception or prenatal 
genetic screening, or the use of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (techniques used to effectively 
filter out and eradicate embryos and foetuses affected by genetic conditions, or prevent their 
conception in the first place), germline genome editing techniques differ substantially in their 
approach to genetic disease prevention. As Cavaliere (2018) has argued, such technologies are 
targeted towards the correction or removal of disabling genetic traits, rather than the so-called ‘seek 
and destroy’ approach of currently used technologies (Rothstein, 2001). Through preservation of the 
life of the embryo (that would otherwise be disabled), and eradication only of the disabling trait, 
germline genome editing indeed appears to neatly sidestep one of the most critical social and ethical 
concerns levelled at current methods of genetic disease amelioration: that the disabling trait is 
considered more significant than the life of the embryo or foetus.  
Parens and Asch (2000) have been amongst those who have most prominently developed this 
critique, initially in relation to prenatal testing and selective termination although more recently 
towards other technologies and practices. Parens and Asch argue that such technological 
intervention involves otherwise wanted embryos/foetuses being eradicated on the grounds of a 
single genetic difference; a genetic trait that is assigned such negative value as to render all other 
characteristics and traits of that (would-be) person irrelevant (Parens and Asch, 2000). Given the 
nature of this critique, it does not take a large intellectual leap to arrive at the second most 
commonly cited disability rights critique of selective reprogenetic practices, known as the 
‘expressivist objection’ (Buchanan, 1996). This objection holds that selective reprogenetic practices 
not only prevent disabled people from coming into existence, but that their very availability- and the 
associated, and often clandestine, social pressures to use them (Clarke, 1991; Markens et al, 2010)- 
both convey and perpetuate negative views about the particular disabling conditions they are 
targeted towards, and, by extension, people who currently live with those conditions (Asch and 
Wasserman, 2015). Moreover, these negative appraisals of disability are seen as reverberating 
throughout wider society, affirming and reinforcing negative appraisals of the lives and worth not 
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only of people with screened/tested for conditions, but of disabled people as a whole (Peterson, 
2012).  
Recent empirical research by myself and other researchers clearly demonstrate the existence, 
ethical dilemmas and the ambivalence towards genetic technologies that emerge directly from these 
two concerns about reprogenetic technologies in the accounts of both genetically, and non-
genetically disabled people (Boardman, 2014). My research has revealed, for example, that the 
majority of people with genetic disabilities feel that it would be a loss to society to have fewer 
people with their particular condition coming into the world (Boardman and Hale, 2018) and the 
majority (90%) of family members of people with genetic disabilities such as haemophilia, for 
example, feel uncomfortable with the idea of pregnancy termination for the condition in their family 
(Boardman et al, 2019).  
Despite this burgeoning body of research (e.g. Roadhouse et al, 2018; Barter et al, 2017; Stern et al, 
2002; Taneja et al, 2004; Maxwell et al, 2011; Potrata et al, 2013; Gollust et al, 2003), however, the 
voices of the disability community remain largely under-represented in dialogue around the future 
development of reproductive genomic medicine such as genome editing (Wolbring and Diep, 2016), 
and an ongoing and challenging relationship of mistrust and suspicion has been observed between 
the disability and genetics communities (Madeo et al, 2011). 
The development of human germline genome editing is particularly significant, however, because 
unlike current practice, it directly challenges the first of the disability rights critiques of selective 
reproduction outlined above. By retaining- as an alternative to destroying- the (would-be) disabled 
embryo, and instead removing only the disabling trait, genome editing marks a significant departure 
in the way in which genetically selective reproduction operates. Whilst, as Kleiderman and Kellner 
Stedman (2019) outline, for many people with genetic conditions, this possibility suggests clear 
benefits for the embryo in question, their family and wider society, the assumption that this 
development is of universal benefit to the disability community may be challenged when expressivist 
objections and the identity politics of disability and personhood is taken into account. 
As Shakespeare (2006) and others outline, research that explores the relationship between disabled 
people and the concept of cure, or other modes of disability removal (e.g. reprogenetics) is complex 
and multi-faceted, with disabled people experiencing particular forms of impairment (typically those 
involving pain, deterioration and shortened-life span) more likely to welcome the notion of disability 
removal than others (e.g. those with static impairments since birth). For example, recent research on 
adults with Spinal Muscular Atrophy has highlighted a degree of ambivalence towards the first, and 
only recently licensed, drug therapy for the condition, Nusinersen (Pacione et al, 2019). Some adults 
with SMA, particularly those with the static form of impairment (type II), regard their condition as an 
integral part of their personhood and identity and as a mediator of their interactions with the world. 
This deep cleft in the responses between genetically disabled people with contrasting experiences of 
their impairment, of disability and also the role of identity politics in their lives has also been 
mirrored in studies that explore attitudes towards genetic screening (Roadhouse et al, 2018; 
Boardman et al, 2017; Gollust et al, 2003). A recognition of the emerging literature that explores the 
role of impairment experiences and identity politics, therefore, is critical to understanding the broad 
spectrum of responses that are currently being observed amongst genetically disabled people to 
technologies that ameliorate genetic disability, of which genome editing is but one.  
It is not yet possible to explore the new forms of personhood, identity and genetic relatedness that 
will inevitably emerge amongst individuals subject to embryonic germline genome editing in the 
future. The argument espoused by many prominent ethicists, that life without disability is 
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unequivocally preferable to one with disability, would render genome editing a technology of 
undeniable benefit to the embryo in question (Savulescu et al, 2015; Savulescu and Singer, 2019). 
However, such a focus on the benefit to individual embryos is to overlook the broader societal 
changes that genome editing will signal, as well as the potential negative impacts on existing persons 
with genetic conditions (Coller, 2019). Indeed, unlike currently used forms of reprogenetic selection, 
genome editing, by treating germ cells, not only eliminates genetic variation in the treated embryo, 
but also makes permanent and heritable changes to the germline, that will invariably be transferred 
to offspring, consequently reducing the incidence of the genetic condition in the human gene pool in 
ways that currently used technologies are not capable of.  
People with lived experience of genetic conditions have much to offer our current understanding of 
the social, personal and ethical implications this technology will have. Expressivist concerns around 
genome editing, and the potential negative impacts on people with unedited genomes or 
spontaneous mutations are important considerations as we move towards genomic futures where 
genome editing is normalised (and non-use socially penalised) along with the inevitable changes to 
the demographic characteristics of society that will follow (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2018: 78).  
Whilst the technologies and methods of implementation of genomic medicine are likely to transform 
and shift overtime, the core ethical and social issues that genetic disability eradication and/or 
minimisation present, will invariably remain the same. It is critical, therefore, that the literature 
exploring the views of people with the most vivid and visceral insights into the lived realities of 
genetic disability are included and valued in the processes of development and evaluation of new 
technologies such as genome editing (Petersen, 2006). This is not only so that the potential impacts 
on them can be explored, but also so that informed decisions regarding which conditions are the 
appropriate targets of genome editing can be made. Indeed, given the inherent potential of germline 
genome editing, this inclusion is now of paramount importance, when it is considered that such 
voices and experiences could eventually become a resource of increasing inaccessibility in the 
future.  
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